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Abstract
Over recent years, science and technology have been reassessed increas-
ingly in ethical terms. Particularly for life science governance, ethics has
become the dominant discourse. In the course of this ‘‘ethical turn’’ national
ethics councils were set up throughout Europe and in the United States to
advice politics in ethically controversial issues such as stem cell research and
genetic testing. Ethics experts have become subject to traditional warnings
against expertocracy: they are suspected to unduly influence political deci-
sion-making. However, any reliable ethics expertise has to reflect societal
disagreements in moral issues. Therefore, expert dissent is a normal feature
of legitimate ethics expertise. Based on theoretical considerations we argue
that in principle, expert dissent does not cause problems for political legiti-
macy; rather, it enhances the salience of politics: obviously decisions on
ethical issues cannot be taken on the basis of expert knowledge alone.
We therefore conclude that expert dissent, not consent, supports politics.
Focussing on Germany and Austria, we show how politics deal with expert
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dissent in practice. While in Germany politics acknowledge dissent and
use it to foster a fundamental political debate, Austrian politics attribute
authoritative power to ethics expertise and try to construct an overall
consensus. This illustrates how the drawing of boundaries between politic
and expertise differs.
Keywords
public bioethics, ethics commissions, ethics expertise, ethicization, science
and technology controversies
There is a long tradition of social-scientific reflection on the relationship
between science and politics, and research on expertise also seems to have
a promising future. Among the developments that bear witness to this are
ongoing debates in the field of science and technology studies. Harry Col-
lins and Robert Evans (2002), for example, have spoken of a new phase in
science studies in which ‘‘studies of expertise and experience’’ are coming
to the fore. The work by Collins and Evans on ‘‘interactional expertise,’’
which emphasizes the ability to use a number of disciplinary and field-
specific ‘‘languages’’ (as distinct from being competent in the practices
of these disciplines or fields) documents important aspects of this new
phase (Collins and Evans 2007).
In this article, we concentrate on a kind of expertise that is constructed in
a specific way: ethics expertise. This kind of expertise is produced by ethics
councils, commissions that have been set up in many countries for the
express purpose of providing policy advice (Fuchs 2005). This needs to
be placed in the context of a broader upsurge in the attention paid to ethics.
There is absolutely no doubt that we are today experiencing an increase in
the number of problems and conflict situations that are being negotiated
with the help of appeals to ethics. Scientific and technological conflicts,
in particular, are at present increasingly being dealt with in terms of ethical
concepts and categories. To describe this situation in more precise terms,
we start off by sketching our own understanding of ethics as a specific
governance semantics and setting out the challenges this presents for the
formulation of sociological theories (sections Ethics and Governance: the
‘‘Ethicization’’ of the Political Discourse and Ethics as a Desideratum for
Sociology). After this, we provide an account of the distinguishing features
of debates that are conducted by means of appeals to ethics, as distinct from
those that are addressed within a risk framework (section Ethics as Conflict
Framing). After this, we examine the ways in which ethics expertise is used
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by politics. We restrict this discussion to the debate about stem cell research
and concentrate for the most part on Germany and Austria, while making
comparative observations about the United Kingdom and United States,
from time to time. After brief accounts of the most important institutions
involved in the provision of ethical policy advice (section The Institutiona-
lization of Ethics—the Landscape of Bioethics Councils) and of the most
significant reports they have produced (section Controversial Ethics Exper-
tise as a Product of the Advisory Bodies), we analyze the significance of
expert dissent over ethical questions for political decision making (section
Legitimization Problems in Ethical Decision Making? Two Ways of
Dealing Politically With Expert Dissent). We show that expertise is treated
differently in different countries and that these differences symbolize differ-
ent ways of marking the boundary between expertise and politics (section
Summary and Prospects).
Ethics and Governance: the ‘‘Ethicization’’ of the
Political Discourse
Ethics, a traditional field of philosophy that was threatened by a loss of sig-
nificance a few decades ago, is today a lively discourse with high political
relevance. Ethics has become a decisive level of reflection and legitimiza-
tion for the regulation of fundamentally contested societal–political ques-
tions in a wide range of social spheres. One is almost tempted to claim
that today ethics is the decisive semantic form in which governance dis-
courses are being conducted (see also Braun et al. 2008; Moore 2009).
Some even argue that ethics and governance are today thought of as being
as closely connected as ethics and technology were once thought to be (see
von Schomberg 2007).1 From the perspective of science and technology
studies, the first examples that spring to mind in the context of ethical gov-
ernance are contested research such as stem cell research and potentially
controversial technologies such as nanotechnology. However, the ethics
discourse is not restricted to ‘‘Knowledge Politics’’ (Stehr 2005), that is
to say to the reactive or anticipatory regulation of (potentially) controversial
research.
Ethics as a discourse of governance has also made itself felt in the eco-
nomic sphere. In view of the growing importance of organizational policy
formulated in ethical terms, some scholars have spoken of a ‘‘Renaissance
of Ethics’’ (Pruzan and Thyssen 1994). Or, to take an example from a quite
different field, analyses of the sphere of consumption have raised the
question of the growing significance of ethical criteria for decisions about
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individual purchases (Moorstedt 2007). Nico Stehr (2006) has recently
spoken of a ‘‘moralization of the markets’’ in this context.
We can observe a comparable relevance of ethical categories in interna-
tional politics. In this sphere, conflict constellations are increasingly being
conceptualized in the categories of good and evil. Examples such as the
expression ‘‘axis of evil’’ demonstrate what one can describe as the mora-
lization of politics: the construction of political opposition is not carried out
along the coordinates left/right or above/below but in the ethical–moral
categories of ‘‘right’’ and ‘‘wrong’’ (Mouffe 2005). Medicine, to take a third
sphere, has always involved ethical reflection and guidance. In view of
growing uncertainty about decisions and the dilemmas that arise everyday
in hospitals, medicine today needs ethical assistance more than ever. High-
tech medicine and modern biomedicine give rise to questions of borderlines
at the beginning and end of life and have contributed to a revival of ethical
debate. Biomedical research has also become a field in which, because of
conflicts over values and a high level of uncertainty, questions of regulation
are treated as ethical problems.2 In this context, new models of governance
involving stakeholders and citizens’ participation are also being tried out.3
However, ethics has a much wider significance. If one takes into consid-
eration the establishment and professionalization of additional branches of
ethics such as sport ethics, environmental ethics, and media ethics, it
becomes clear that ethics is now the relevant discourse of reflection in
nearly all areas of society. In this sense, one could argue that what we are
currently experiencing is a proliferation of ethics as a specific discourse of
reflection into various fields of society.
This does not imply that normative orientations would not influence
actions in one of the above fields. Of course, there is no social action that
would not be norm guided. But we can observe a remarkable increase in
importance of a particular form of reflection in the public discourse on the
basis of ethical concepts and rhetoric. Previously implicit norms are made
explicit in a discourse framed in ethical terms.
Ethics as a Desideratum for Sociology
The diffusion of ethics we have described creates difficulties for social the-
ory. Niklas Luhmann assumed in his early work that the purpose of ethics
and morality was to stabilize interaction systems—in the form of ‘‘implicit
or explicit communication about respect’’ (Luhmann 1978, 51). From this
perspective, ethics plays no role at all at the level of societal subsystems and
is only significant in interpersonal communication. In later work, though, as
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he seeks to incorporate the boom in bioethics, Luhmann speaks of a moral
reshaping of issues that are ‘‘in reality’’ questions of risk. This treats ethics,
especially in the form of institutionalized expertise, as a kind of delayed
politicization of disputed questions in which certain parties and positions
are not represented (Luhmann 1997). But by arguing in this way, Luhmann
does not do justice to the importance of ethics as a governance discourse.
Ethics is not an ‘‘ideological’’ variant of the risk discourse, so to speak, but
rather a distinct discourse that frames conflicts over technology in a specific
way and creates new obligations to negotiate and to legitimize one’s posi-
tion, as we argue (see section Ethics as Conflict Framing). Wolfgang Krohn
(1999) has tried to demonstrate the value of systems theory by carrying out
a functional analysis of the system-specific contributions made by institu-
tionalized ethics. He traces the development of ethical discourse as a prog-
ress from ethical–universalist reflection to system-specific ethics each of
which stabilized certain ways of operating by shielding them from universal
normative claims and ensuring that they could not get mixed up with other
systemic logics. But one has to ask whether political and ethical questions
can really be kept separate. Medical ethics in particular is a field in which
there is a discussion about precisely this question, universalizable ethical
categories related to the societal shaping of the ‘‘good life.’’
Systems theory is not the only grand sociological theory that has diffi-
culty conceptualizing ethics. Ju¨rgen Habermas’ theory of communication,
for example, has no way of analyzing ethics and morality sociologically
because Habermas incorporates these categories, so to speak, into his theo-
retical framework. By treating discourses as expressions of the recognition
of their own inherent validity, he makes ethicality a structural feature of
human communication. But this places systematic obstacles in the way of
any sociological examination of the processes that produce ethics dis-
courses. It is therefore unsurprising that Habermas’ work has been of most
value in the field of discourse ethics but has not proved fruitful for the
sociology of ethics.
Ulrich Beck is strangely indifferent to ethics discourses and questions of
value. As the theoretician of risk society, he has made a major contribution
by sharpening our awareness of new kinds of risk conflict and showing that
we need to distinguish these from classically modern interest conflicts and
conflicts over distribution (Beck 1992). However, also in his more recent
publications Beck has not drawn a clear conceptual line between risk-type
conflicts and questions of value; climate change and terrorism are both sub-
sumed under the concept of world risk (Beck 2007), and he fails to consider
the special character of conflicts that take the form of disputes about values.
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We need to distinguish between conflicts that arise because of risks and
those that take the form of ethical disputes. If this is not done, it is
impossible to see clearly the particular significance of expertise in current
conflicts related to biomedicine. For this reason, we want to look briefly at
this question.
Ethics as Conflict Framing
In the recent past, societal controversies about the development of science
and technology have been increasingly ‘‘ethicized.’’ This applies particu-
larly to the controversies that have been taking place about (new) technol-
ogies and branches of research in the field of life sciences (Lindsay et al.
2001). Concrete examples that can be mentioned include the continuing dis-
pute about the use of ‘‘excess,’’ deep-frozen human embryos or cloning for
research purposes. In all these cases, issues in science and technology pol-
icy are expressly framed as questions of ethics. The ethics discourse appears
to us today as nothing less than the natural form in which disputed issues
should be addressed.4
The reference to ethics distinguishes these controversies from debates
that are primarily negotiated and dealt with in terms of concepts of risk like
the disputes and debates about large-scale technologies that have taken
place since the 1960s. The typical feature of risk situations is that they
involve conflicts relating to knowledge about the likelihood of certain
events occurring and the attribution of the consequences of actions. What
is the likelihood of a maximum credible accident in a nuclear reactor over
the next twenty years? Or, when one looks at events that have already hap-
pened: how many people died or suffered as a result of the Chernobyl
nuclear disaster? There is hardly any disagreement here about the normative
evaluation of the consequences themselves; the disagreement is (‘‘only’’)
about their causes, calculations about the probability of their occurrence,
and the chances of preventing them. In ethically framed debates, it is the
assessment of the event itself that gives rise to such heated exchanges. Is
‘‘using’’ an embryo tantamount to killing a human being that should be pro-
tected and has its own dignity? Is it even permissible to weigh the relative
value of protecting human dignity against the possibility of finding a cure
for diseases?5
Questions of science and technology policy framed in terms of ethical
concepts pose a particular challenge to the political system, that is, to a sys-
tem that has to take valid decisions that are accepted as legitimate. Ethically
framed questions are distinguished by the fact that one cannot decide with
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certainty what is to be done, since there is no societal consensus on right and
wrong. In addition, in relation to this kind of question, the existence of dif-
ferent views is no longer considered a problem that could in principle be
overcome, removed with the help of greater rationality and more discus-
sion; if anything, the range of views is accepted as understandable and even
necessary. Different ethical positions can each in their own way claim to be
credible. In the context of an ethics frame, any hope of consensus is aban-
doned—which does not happen in a risk frame; even if it is accepted that
consensus is difficult to reach practically, it is still possible in theory, and
it is still the leading idea. To put it in a nutshell: Ethicization renders con-
sensus suspicious. Would it be plausible to reach a general consensus in
normative questions among the public even if experts fail to agree? The rise
of ethics implies that it is no longer disagreement that has to be justified.
Rather, agreement has to be explained. To avoid any misunderstanding, the
orientation toward consensus within ethics councils is an instrumental pre-
condition to arrive at a structured, well-ordered dissent as a result of sorting
out arguments and thought lines. However, in the light of ethicization, any
attempt to arrive at fundamental consensus has to be considered futile and
the result may be of little credibility. That is why, the ethical framing of
questions of research policy presents problems with a particular structure
for political action and decision making. Politics now has to deal with the
(familiar) question of not only how different interests can be realized,
weighed up, or discouraged but also how to mediate between diverging bod-
ies of knowledge and risk calculations. It is now quite obvious that politics
also has to take decisions about what modern biomedical research proce-
dures are to be permitted under conditions of normative uncertainty. What
political actions can, in view of this normative uncertainty, be presented to
public opinion as justified? Which decisions are accepted as legitimate?
The institutional response to this problem seems at first glance to be a
conventional one. Expert knowledge is what could be called the classical
instrument to which politics turns when it has to justify decisions taken
in conditions of uncertainty. However, this is now not just a matter of cer-
tainty about questions of knowledge (scientific experts have plenty of expe-
rience in the production of this kind of certainty) but also of certainty about
questions of value. It is much more difficult to answer the question about
relevant expert knowledge here—who can be considered any kind of expert
on questions of values, morality, and ethics?6
We can observe today a wide range of commission-like advisory bodies
designed to assure legitimacy of political action in ethical questions. Such is
the demand for bioethics expertise that there has been a veritable boom in
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commission ethics. In Germany and Austria, the two countries on which we
concentrate from now on, this has led to a situation where different forums
for institutional expertise exist simultaneously, a degree of confusion, and
sometimes even to these bodies working against each other.
The Institutionalization of Ethics—the Landscape of
Bioethics Councils
In this section, we single out and present in more detail the advisory bodies
that have been of most significance for biopolitics in Germany and Austria,
in recent years.7 A comparison of these two countries is instructive because
they are similar with regard to the structure of the political system and to the
dominant philosophical discourse (deontological tradition). Furthermore,
the biopolitical debate in both countries is closely related to the legacy of
the Third Reich, which contributes to generally critical public attitudes
toward research and to comparatively restrictive regulations of biomedi-
cine. Due to these similarities, the differences with respect to how politics
deals with expert dissent get highlighted.8
We only deal here with two of the most important kinds of body, national
advisory bodies set up by the executive and legislative branches. The
German Study Commission (Enquete-Kommission) existed between 2000
and 2005 in two different constellations and was the main institution
responsible for advising the German parliament on questions of bioethics.
To provide policy advice to the German executive at the national level, the
National Ethics Council (Nationaler Ethikrat or NER) was set up.9 These
councils have produced the most important experts’ reports on controversial
questions of biomedicine in recent years.
The NER started to work in May 2001. Its establishment was accompa-
nied by controversies that at times became very heated, in the Bundestag
and elsewhere.10 The NER had twenty-four members. It was set up on inter-
disciplinary lines but was not exclusively made up of specialists in the most
immediately relevant fields. There were seven natural scientists (from biol-
ogy, medicine, and genetics), five lawyers, four ethicists or philosophers,
four theologians, two social scientists, and two representatives of disabled
people’s organizations. It is hard to draw a line between the ‘‘experts
model’’ and the ‘‘stakeholders model’’ here, since in practice these two
roles can hardly be separated from one another. (Is the head of a biomedical
research institute a representative of the interests of his occupational group,
someone whose role is to provide natural-scientific expertise, or both?)
According to the NER’s own official understanding of its role, it was
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supposed to focus the interdisciplinary academic discourse, provide a forum
for dialogue with citizens, and finally to express its considered view on
‘‘ethical questions posed by new developments in the life sciences, and
on their consequences for the individual and society’’ (Ethikrat-Einrich-
tungserlass). The NER carried out its responsibilities as a policy advisory
body by presenting a total of twelve comprehensive reports. The reports
on stem cell research, prenatal diagnosis, and cloning can be singled out
as having attracted public attention.
Two study commissions (Enquete Kommission, EK) worked parallel to
the NER up until the summer of 2005. The EK on Law and Ethics in Mod-
ern Medicine existed from March 2000 until 2002, during the fourteenth
parliamentary term of the Bundestag.11 It was set up by the Bundestag to
provide ethical–social evaluations of biomedical progress to prepare ‘‘deci-
sions that have to be taken by the German Bundestag’’ (BT-Drucksache 14/
3011). This EK was made up of thirteen members of the Bundestag and
thirteen experts. The strength of the parliamentary fractions determined
how many members of each party sat on the commission, and the experts
were appointed by the parties. This EK was also noteworthy for its attempt
to raise the issue of bioethics as a question to be actively discussed in the
public sphere. During the two years of its existence, this EK published two
reports on subjects such as stem cell research.
In May 2003, the EK was reconstituted for the next parliamentary term
with a slightly different title ‘‘EK on Ethics and Law in Modern Medicine’’
(the accent was now shifted away from law and toward ethics). There were
some significant differences of focus in this new period. During the four-
teenth parliamentary term biomedical issues had been to the fore, but from
2003 onward, the EK spent most of its time discussing questions relating to
the end of life (palliative care, advance directives). This was obviously an
attempt to give the EK a distinct profile as a body discussing different issues
from those being dealt with by the NER.
In Austria, a national Bioethics Commission at the Federal Chancellery
(BEK) was set up in June 2001, shortly after comparable expert bodies had
been set up in Germany and Switzerland. This commission has to date
issued nine reports, of which those on stem cell research (2002) and preim-
plantation genetic diagnosis (PGD; 2004) have attracted attention among
the public and policy makers.
When one compares the Austrian commission with the other NERs, three
things stand out: (1) The majority of statements issued by the commission
have been responses to requests from the government; most of them have
been commentaries on proposals for national legislation or on EU
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conventions due to be ratified. Reports on issues selected by the commis-
sion itself have been the exception. (2) There is an explicit provision giv-
ing members of government and administration the right to participate in
meetings of the BEK. There is no comparable provision outside Austria.
These two points reflect the fact that the BEK is very close to the world
of politics. Of particular interest for our purposes is (3) the explicitly polit-
ical provision that the task of the BEK is to produce consensus. Section
7(2) of the decree setting up the commission reads as follows: ‘‘When
passing its resolutions, the commission shall strive to reach the broadest
possible consensus.’’ Compare this with the diametrically opposed
wording of George W. Bush’s Executive Order setting up the President’s
Council on Bioethics (PCB):
The Council shall strive to develop a deep and comprehensive understand-
ing of the issues that it considers. In pursuit of this goal, the Council shall be
guided by the need to articulate fully the complex and often competing
moral positions on any given issue, rather than by an overriding concern
to find consensus. The Council may therefore choose to proceed by offering
a variety of views on a particular issue, rather than attempt to reach a single
consensus position.
The wording of the corresponding documents of the German and Swiss
ethics councils is similar to that of the U.S. order. The Austrian commission
currently has twenty-five members—ten medical specialists from different
fields, four geneticists, three lawyers, three philosophers, two theologians,
and two social scientists. Since the end of 2007, the commission has also
included a representative of a large disabled people’s organization. The set-
ting up of the commission can be seen as a conscious and clear renunciation
of a traditional Austrian model of policy advice (Gmeiner 2005). The
Commission was constituted as an expert body rather than as one made
up of representatives of the parties and other interests.
Criticism from disabled people’s associations of the original makeup of
the Bioethics Commission led, also in 2001, to the founding of a counter-
commission, the Bioethics Commission FOR the Austrian Government
(emphasis in the original). The declared objective of this alternative com-
mission set up by disabled people’s associations was to offer the chancellor
a second opinion. It was dissolved in the autumn of 2006, after failing to
secure the necessary basic financial support. At the end of its period of
activity, this body had fourteen members (at times it had had up to
twenty-one), with equal numbers of women and men, all of whom belonged
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to disabled people’s organizations. The statements issued by this commis-
sion were without exception critical. Its contacts with the government
bioethics commission were good.
Controversial Ethics Expertise as a Product of the
Advisory Bodies
In view of the question, we have set out to answer how politics deals with
expert dissent; it is of course particularly interesting to ask whether and in
what form the experts produce dissent. It turns out that there are striking dif-
ferences between the councils, but these only become apparent when one
looks beyond continental Europe.
The distinctive feature of the reports issued by George W. Bush’s PCB,
convened in 2001, is that they adopt the style of a report on the state of
knowledge in a field, presenting an overview of ethical points of view and
arguments. ‘‘[W]e don’t have a collective view,’’ said Leon Kass, a former
chair of the PCB, at a meeting with George W. Bush in the White House at
the beginning of 2002. One can see that this is indeed the case in the Coun-
cil’s two reports on stem cell research (The President’s Council on
Bioethics [PCB] 2004, 2005). Here, in the framework of a jointly authored
treatment of ethical aspects of stem cell research, widely diverging points of
view are set out without any attempt to evaluate them. The declared goal of
the Council is to list arguments and counterarguments to inform policy
makers and the public and to contribute to a more differentiated debate. The
absence of consensus is not revealed in the form of distinct statements of
different views but emerges as the jointly prepared text moves from one
issue to the next (‘‘some believe . . . others point out’’). These reports con-
tain no recommendations for political action, let alone any unanimous ones.
For this reason, no votes are taken on ethical positions; personal statements
by individuals can only be found, if at all, in appendices (in the case of the
2005 stem cell report).
The situation in the United Kingdom is quite different. Here, the Nuf-
field Council on Bioethics (NCB), which enjoys a degree of authority and
respect comparable to that of a national bioethics council (see Jasanoff
2005, 185ff.), published a report on stem cell research in 2000. This article
addresses ethical questions, but the main thing it does is to formulate clear
recommendations for action in research policy—based on consensus! The
report states that the Council considers the production of stem cell lines
to be legitimate, because this contributes to scientific progress and has ther-
apeutic uses (Nuffield Council on Bioethics [NCB] 2000). And this is not an
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isolated case. The NCB’s reports contain none of the things one would nor-
mally expect to find as the specific quality of debates about ethics in expert
commissions made up of people from different backgrounds—a range of
views, minority opinions, and votes on divergent recommendations. Even
on those rare occasions when different ethical positions are summarized, the
end result is a shared conviction (e.g., NCB 2002, XXVII). One would have
to look at this body more closely to identify the basis of the consensus. One
important factor is, without doubt, the fact that within the NCB, consensus
among experts is considered the criterion of high-quality expertise.12 In
addition, the recruitment policy contributes to an underrepresentation of
deviating opinions and fundamental criticism such as from representatives
of the churches or from philosophical positions beyond the utilitarian
mainstream (Kastenhofer 2009, 100).13
Because we want to look in this section at the political use of expertise in
the cases of Germany and Austria, we will explain briefly how societal dis-
agreement in these countries is reflected in expertise on ethics. Once again,
we look only at the case of stem cell research.
In 2002, a political decision had to be taken in Germany on the import
of human embryonic stem cell lines. The production and use of embryos
had already been banned by the 1991 Embryo Protection Law (Embryo-
nenschutzgestz, EschG). Up until that point, there was no legislation
specifying whether stem cells obtained from embryos could be brought
into the country from abroad and used for research The politicians’ desire
to come to an informed opinion on this matter was prompted by an appli-
cation for funding submitted to the most important state-funded body for
financing research, the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), from a
brain researcher who wanted to conduct a research project using human
embryonic stem cells. The DFG wanted to wait for a Bundestag decision
before finalizing its position, and this decision was originally supposed to
be taken in 2001 (as it turned out, September 11 disrupted the schedule).
As a preparatory step paving the way for a new law regulating the import
of stem cells, the expert commissions worked out their positions on this
question.
The report of the EK on Law and Ethics in Modern Medicine (Enquete-
Kommission [EK] 2002), which comprises 150 pages, begins with an
overview of the state of the debate in the scientific and medical literature
and of the legal position in Germany and elsewhere, and this is followed
by a discussion on the ethical issues, especially the moral status of the
embryo. The positions said to be most frequently encountered in our society
are summarized. After this, the report sums up the legal discussions. Up
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until this point, the paper’s wording is that of a report on the state of
knowledge in the field. Diverging ethical and legal positions are presented
without being evaluated. At the end of the report, recommendations for
political decision making are presented. These are to a considerable extent
pragmatically oriented, so that different ethical views can be summarized in
one option. The overwhelming majority of the commission’s members
advocate a ban on stem cell imports, while a minority propose the toleration
of imports as long as strict conditions are met.
In December 2001, not long after the parliamentary commission had
reported, the NER published its statement on the same topic (Nationaler
Ethikrat [National Ethics Council, NER] 2002). Because the Council had
to work to a very tight schedule, its report is much shorter than that of the
Study Commission and not as wide ranging in terms of the issues it
addresses. After some brief preliminary remarks, the assessment begins
immediately. The discussion is organized by dividing it into strictly sepa-
rated subsections presenting arguments for and against, and this makes it
very simplistic. Much of the time the two positions being presented come
across as no more than criticisms of the counterarguments, and the argu-
ment never develops any rigor of its own. The ethical discussion about the
moral status of the embryo is very short. In the concrete recommendations
for legislators and the government, four positions are set out, two of which
are subsets within the more broadly formulated basic positions. Fifteen
members of the Council voted to allow imports (and nine of these also voted
to permit the production of stem cell lines in Germany); ten members voted
for a moratorium; and a subgroup of four members considered the import of
stem cells fundamentally unethical. To sum up, while the majority of the
NER’s members voted in favor of importing stem cells, the majority of
members of the EK were against this.
The report of the Austrian Bioethics Commission (BEK) addresses the
same topics, but this body operated in a quite different political context
from the German councils. In Austria, debates about the EU’s Sixth Frame-
work Programme (FP6) for research led unexpectedly to the emergence of
stem cell research as a political issue in 2001-2002. There were disputes
about whether Austrian taxpayers’ money should be spent on supporting
research with embryos in the rest of Europe. Up until this point, stem cell
research had not been a matter of political debate in Austria, which was
partly a reflection of the fact that there was no research in this field worth
speaking of being conducted in the country. It is therefore unsurprising that
Austria, like some East European countries, also has no specific laws
dealing with research using embryonic stem cells.
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The dispute about the FP6 erupted in this vacuum; Austria had to formu-
late a position of its own. At the end of 2001, the minister responsible asked
the BEK to draw up a report containing such a position. ‘‘We needed a deci-
sion,’’ a senior official explained to us in an interview. The BEK produced a
report rapidly but—in contrary to its mandate—was unable to make a clear
recommendation. The short report is made up of a brief consensual part and
the presentation of two positions. Eleven members voted to support work on
already existing human embryonal stem cell lines as long as certain condi-
tions were met. Eight members rejected research on embryonal stem cells
outright. The position taken by the majority in favor of research is formu-
lated in fairly defensive terms. This was due to the political circumstances.
The minister had taken a rejectionist stance in Brussels at an early stage, so
the experts’ suggestion that the government could adopt a less restrictive
position had to be expressed diplomatically enough for her to be able to
change her position without losing face. The argument of those opposed
to research, however, reads in large part like a commentary on the position
of their more liberal opponents. It is noticeable that any discussion on the
moral status of the embryo, which as a rule is the main objection put
forward against any lifting of restrictions on stem cell research, is avoided
here. One can interpret this as recognition that profound ethical debates are
counterproductive if the objective is the speedy formulation of a policy
recommendation.14
We can therefore observe ways of dealing with dissent on ethical ques-
tions that take specific forms in different countries. In the United States, the
PCB performed a kind of informational mapping of ethical positions with-
out deducing any political recommendations from this map. In the United
Kingdom, where consensus among experts is considered an expression of
the rationalization of political debate, the focus is on unanimous proposals
for regulation. In Germany and Austria, the ethics councils respect the exis-
tence of dissent, but when concrete recommendations for action have to be
made, these differences are bundled together. One could therefore argue
that different ideal conceptions of the process of providing political advice
are expressed in the specific ways divergent views are dealt with within the
commissions. If one takes Pielke’s (2007) idealized typology of forms of
policy advice as one’s model, Germany and Austria can be said to come
close to the ‘‘Honest Broker of Policy Alternatives’’ type.15 This means that
ethics councils function in such a way that, in a situation characterized by
conflicts over values and a high degree of uncertainty, the range of options
available to decision makers can be clarified by submitting clustered state-
ments of the wide discourse.16
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Legitimization Problems in Ethical Decision Making?
Two Ways of Dealing Politically with Expert Dissent
Zygmunt Bauman has recently expressed the suspicion that most of the
tasks previously reserved to the legislator will be taken over by ‘‘the varie-
gated crowd of counsellors, interpreters and brokers’’ (Bauman 2000, 48),
assuming that the modern state is no longer willing to act as the master
builder of the rational society. We encounter this idea wherever people are
puzzling over the function of national ethics policy advice. One can read
warnings about the rise of an ‘‘advisers’ republic’’ and a ‘‘deparliamentar-
ization of politics’’ (see Schu¨ttemeyer 2008). Politics, it is argued, is
increasingly being influenced by a caste of experts that have no democratic
legitimacy. The counterargument, which nevertheless has a good deal in
common with the first view, is that ethics councils are submissive instru-
ments serving political decision markers. Their function, it is claimed, is
solely to provide legitimatory support for political positions that have
already been decided upon. Continuing this line of thought, it is suggested
that Gerhard Schro¨der’s only purpose in setting up the NER was to create a
forum in which moral reservations about stem cell research could be dis-
cussed and then set aside. The philosopher Gerold Prauss (2001), for exam-
ple, has spoken of a ‘‘council for the Chancellor’s ethics.’’
Is it the case that ethics expertise determines what is politically possible?
Or that it simply serves political leaders as a way of providing a veneer of
scientific authority for decisions that have already been taken? To investi-
gate these questions, we return to the case of stem cell research.17
In Germany, the broad public debate about stem cell research came to an
end for the time being when the German law on stem cells was passed in
2002. We have already described the ethics expertise that was mobilized
in this process; the two positions were divided internally as well as between
the councils. While the majority of members of the Ethics Council voted for
the import of stem cells (under certain conditions), the majority of members
of the Study Commission voted against this.
In the end, the German parliament took a decision that did not involve
adopting the proposal made by the majority of the (parliamentary) Study
Commission. After the great debate of January 30, 2002, which was consid-
ered to have been one of the Bundestag’s finest hours, the proposal adopted
was a compromise that permitted the import of stem cells as long as strict
conditions were met (including a cutoff date similar to the U.S. regulation
that limits the time of production of the stem cell lines18). The stem cell law
is thus basically in conformity with the recommendation of the majority of
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the NER. There is a certain irony about this, since the Ethics Council had
been very unpopular among parliamentarians and was seen as a tool of the
biopolitically liberal chancellor.
Our analysis of the way in which politics refers to and makes use of
ethics expertise in the disputes about stem cell research, PGD, and cloning
comes to the following conclusion.19 The reference to the recommendations
are primarily formal but not in terms of content. Usually, not very much is
said about either the tenor of the votes or the majorities or minorities in
favor of particular alternatives. Neither ethical arguments nor concrete posi-
tions are acknowledged in detail. The contents of arguments are not of great
significance, and it seems to be more important that the reports should have
been published. Accordingly, the reports taken in their entirety are wel-
comed as providing an important basis on which political decisions can
be taken.
We would like to quote just one example from a parliamentary debate
about cloning in 2003, ‘‘Regarding this issue (the issue of PGD; AB/
WM) the comprehensive final report of the study commission of the last
legislative period is available; we have available the opinion from the
national ethics council. Arguments pro and con have been carefully elabo-
rated on. This having been done, preparations for taking the decision are
finished. Now everyone of us needs to have the courage to vote on it’’
(Detlev Parr, FDP, Member of the German Bundestag, February 20,
2003, Prot. 15/28, S. 2143).
Similarly, a press release issued by the then German HealthMinister at the
end of 2001 states relating to the stem cell question, ‘‘The two votes by the
Study Commission and the Ethics Council will enrich our parliamentary dis-
cussions. In January, parliament must come to a decision and pass legislation
to regulate these matters’’ (Andrea Fischer, press release No. 677 of the par-
liamentary group of the Green Party, December 2, 2001). On some occasions,
it is stressed that both the EK and the NER reports, because of the way they
succeed in setting out the structure of the debate and clarifying concepts, pro-
vide an important basis for responsible decision making. However, the main
point of political reference is the recognition of expert dissent. The specific
content of the vote among experts is uninteresting; what seems to matter
much more is the fact that, at long last, experts’ reports are now available.
This is interpreted in such a way that political decision makers can—and
must—now take action on the basis of informed expert dissent. This dissent
is interpreted by politics as an invitation to act or rather as a legitimate occa-
sion to ensure that a decision is taken. This was what one Green member of
the Bundestag was saying when, after the publication of the NER report, she
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demanded, ‘‘Now the Bundestag must take a free decision on an issue that is a
matter of conscience’’ (Monika Knoche, press release No. 667 of the
parliamentary group of the Green Party, November 29, 2001).
We can therefore say that politics do not present itself as executor of
what may be a superior variety of experts’ reason. For the most part, they
do not use the experts’ reports on ethics as a way of making their own posi-
tion sound more plausible (‘‘But the Ethics Council has said . . . .’’). This
would in any case not be very convincing; the Ethics Council may have said
X, but it has always said the opposite of X as well. Usually, the reference to
experts’ reports on ethics is more a matter of formally legitimizing what
political decision making has to be. When a range of expert opinions have
been presented, one can point to this ethical stalemate as a signal that it is
time for an independent decision to be taken, a decision that will now be
genuinely political.
One can also see this in a speech by a liberal member of the Bundes-
tag in the great debate about stem cell imports. She said, ‘‘Ladies and
gentlemen, the Study Commission and the National Ethics Council have
made their recommendations, but the decision ( . . . ) lies with us, in the
hands of parliament where it belongs’’ (Ulrike Flach, statement at the
214 meeting of the German Bundestag, January 30, 2002). It is undeni-
able that ethics expertise is important for political decision making, but
this importance remains symbolic. The reports produced by the ethics
commissions are not celebrated as a triumph of ethical–scientific reason
that the political decision makers should follow whenever they are in
doubt but seen as an indication of the existence of coordinated but
insurmountable differences of opinion that make political action
necessary.
Three conclusions can be drawn from this. First, expert dissent over
questions of values does not create any fundamental problem of legitimacy
for politics. It would be more accurate to say that politics as a matter of deci-
sion making only becomes visible once again because of the differences of
opinion among experts. The function of the commissions is to bring about a
public perception that the issues are important and need to be regulated and
that decisions need to be taken. At the same time, the commissions demon-
strate that it is fundamentally impossible to decide these issues at the level
of expert knowledge. And they also make it clear that genuine political
action is necessary to (temporarily) calm things down.
Second, expert dissent serves in a particular way as an indication that
politicians are well informed—they have available to them a defined spec-
trum of points of view that can be justified. Ethics expertise opens up for
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politics a field of plausible, ‘‘socially robust’’ (Nowotny et al. 2001, 167)
positions and so fulfils an important function in providing orientation. At
the same time, in the narrower political decision-making process that takes
place on the parliamentary stage, a specific rationality of political decision
making is constituted, which emphasizes the difference between politics
and science even more strongly. In the parliamentary debate about stem cell
research, speakers repeatedly stressed that the parliamentarians or govern-
ment were confronted with a question of ‘‘personal’’ judgment, a ‘‘matter of
conscience.’’ This shifts political action into the sphere of individual deci-
sions about values. It is not scientific, logical rigor that is used to justify the
political vote, but subjectivity and authenticity (Bogner and Menz 2002).20
Third, expert dissent guarantees political credibility. Where bioethical
questions are concerned, it is not agreement between experts that lacks
credibility but rather a policy that does not immediately give the counterex-
perts the opportunity to have their say as well. The political decision justi-
fies itself not in spite of ambiguous advice from experts on questions of
ethics and morality but through this ambiguity. Against the background
of diverse recommendations, the political decision becomes more legiti-
mate precisely because it could have turned out differently.
In concluding this section, we want to formulate our thesis about the
political functionality of dissent in a more differentiated and sharper way
with the help of a comparison between Germany and Austria. Up to this
point, we have looked at Germany and characterized expert dissent as an
element that stabilizes the distinction between politics and science. How-
ever, it is important to bear in mind that this marking of a clear boundary
only emerges against the background of a very specific political way of han-
dling dissent. Austria turns out to provide an interesting contrast for the
analysis of how expertise is used politically—despite the similarities in the
structure of the political system and the dominant philosophical–ethical dis-
course in both countries.21
We can observe clear differences between theway ethics expertise is used in
Germany and its use inAustria (for a fuller account, seeBogner 2007).Austrian
government justified their rejectionist stance in the dispute about support for
embryonic stem cell research in the FP6 by referring directly to the content
of the Bioethics Commission’s report. The Commission, the government
argued, had made a case for the relevance of restrictions on research that were
not taken into account in the plans drawn up by Brussels. In another case, the
attempt to establish a legal basis for the use of PGD, reference was made to
ethical experts in a similar way. TheMinistry ofHealth, which was responsible
for this question, explained that the envisaged regulation corresponded to the
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substanceof theBioethicsCommission’s vote from2004. Inboth cases, one can
see that policy makers seeking to legitimize their decisions restricted
themselves to pointing out that they were acting in accordance with the views
of theBioethicsCommission. In doing this, political decisionmakingcanget by
without developing any position of its own andproviding supporting arguments
for it. By referring in general terms to ‘‘the’’ vote of the experts, they suggest
that they are being forced to act by ethical considerations, which restrict their
political freedom to influence matters and lead to a situation in which politics
does not even have to make an appearance. Or, to put it in more precise terms:
politicians decide, but they do not want to be seen to be doing so.When biopo-
litical issues get difficult, the politics will hide behind a vote taken by experts.
The problem is that this game of political hide-and-seek can only work as
long as the experts are unanimous. But there is no more unanimity among
experts in Austria than there is in the German expert bodies. Our analysis of
political responses shows that Austrian government constructs an ethical
pressure to act by, in each case, piecing together a consensus from parts
of the majority and minority positions. When one looks closely at the polit-
ical use made of the reports, one sees that they have been quite simply ‘‘fil-
leted.’’ Individual parts of the Bioethics Commission’s reports have been
broken up, recombined, and in this way made compatible with the political
position. However, this does not mean that an experts’ report has simply
been faked. Politics does not lie, it does not fake or fabricate the report;
what it does is to reconfigure it. The result is a consensual position pieced
together out of what is in fact expert dissent.
This way of using an imagined, self-created consensus reveals an
ambivalent (bio)political ideal. On one hand, politicians must presume that
the experts enjoy great authority, since if they do not it is impossible to
explain the efforts made to bring political action into line with the experts’
opinions. On the other hand, the real sovereignty of politics is manifested in
Table 1. Use of Ethics Expertise in Germany and Austria
Germany Austria
Political reference Formal Substantive
Way of dealing with
dissent
Recognition of dissent Creation of consensus
Logic of decision Autonomy (political
rationality, ‘‘conscience’’)
‘‘Heteronomy’’ (hide-and-seek)
Relationship between
expertise and politics
Clear boundaries Unclear boundaries (‘‘politici-
zation of expertise’’)
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its capacity to deal instrumentally with ethics expertise. This shows that for
politics ethics expertise is obviously not tantamount to ‘‘the truth.’’
Summary and Prospects
Two main points can be made in summing up the argument of this article.
First, expert dissent secures and opens up different options for action and
legitimization, and in this respect, it is functional for politics. Politics do not
have their decisions made for it, and they have the possibility of legitimiz-
ing these decisions with reference to expertise. In this way, politics becomes
visible as politics.
Second, our comparison between different countries makes it possible to
see how dissent is handled in different ways for political purposes (table 1).
In Germany, dissent is understood as the prelude to a fundamental political
debate in which legitimacy is produced, not least by means of the quality of
the procedure. This kind of formal reference to ethics expertise presupposes
the recognition of dissent. Of course, the development of independent polit-
ical positions does not take place in a way that is unconnected with expert
knowledge; what happens is that reference is made to the field of
possibilities defined by ethics expertise. This process also has the effect
of releasing a considerable amount of potential for public debate. The issue
of stem cell research, for example, became a topic for TV chat shows and
the front pages of leading newspapers at the time the Bundestag decision
was being taken at the beginning of 2002.
In Austria, we can observe a way of dealing with expertise that attributes
authoritative power to the verdict of the experts. This does not mean that
politicians believe everything the experts say. It does, though, mean that
politicians are convinced they must present themselves as being in agree-
ment with the experts if they are to appear credible. This explains the polit-
ical activities designed to construct clarity and consensus.
If one considers these empirical findings in the light of the concept of
‘‘boundary work’’ (Gieryn 1995) found in the sociology of science, one can
see that in the German case, the boundary between the spheres of advice and
decision making is fairly clearly marked. In Austria, by way of contrast, the
boundaries are much less clear. This can be described as a ‘‘politicization of
expertise,’’ which means that external expertise is subjected to the stubborn
logics of action of the political system itself or politically subsumed. This
does not mean that the experts are politically directed, manipulated, or
determined or that their findings are dictated to them. Nor does it mean that
expertise becomes attributable to a particular political party or can be
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associated with particular interests (Weingart 2001, 131); in moral ques-
tions situated beyond left and right, this does not work. Subsumtion means
that expert knowledge is used in a context where it is interpreted in accor-
dance with nonscientific rules and is reconfigured, though the boundaries
between science and politics remain stable in all other respects.
From the point of view of political science, we can say that dissent
among experts does not present politics with fundamental problems of
legitimacy—on the contrary. In bioethical controversies, expert dissent
seems in fact to be a characteristic that is seen to guarantee the quality of
expertise. In this sphere, unlike other spheres of policy, expert dissent is
seen not just as to be expected but, it seems, actually desirable. In the
national ethics commissions, Catholics and atheists, geneticists and repre-
sentatives of disabled people, friends and enemies sit down together around
the same table. For biopolitical questions, this kind of heterogeneous
appointment to advisory bodies is the norm, and indeed it is evidently
imperative for purposes of legitimization. Would a conservative
government appoint a Marxist economist to advise it on economic policy?
Notes
1. The setting up of a Governance and Ethics Unit in the DG Research of the
European Commission is an institutional expression of this development.
2. For a detailed discussion on this question, see Gottweis (1998), and for an over-
view of the international development of stem cell policy, see Downey, Geransar,
and Einsiedel (2005).
3. On the significance of lay expertise and public consultation in this area, see Kerr,
Cunningham-Burley, and Amos (1998) and Burgess (2004). For a more specific
examination of governance processes, see Joss (2005). Joss and Bellucci (2002)
provide a broad overview of participation in the sphere of science policy.
4. We therefore understand ethics as a ‘‘master frame,’’ in the sense in which
Dahinden (2002) uses this term. These frames are powerful patterns of interpre-
tation that direct our perception, structure information, and order the discourses.
For an overview of the term ‘‘frame,’’ which can be used in many different ways,
see Entman (1993). Entman’s analysis shows clearly that the frame debate has
now traveled a long way from its sociological origins in Goffman’s interest in
the organization of everyday communication (Goffman 1974).
5. The differentiation between a risk frame and an ethics frame does not imply that
economic interests are irrelevant for science and technology policy. However,
addressing economic interests as such is deemed inappropriate in ethically
framed discourses. Any analysis focusing on material interests only misses the
particular conditions of legitimization in differently framed conflicts.
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6. At this point, we do not provide a comprehensive or a substantial definition of
ethics expertise and deliberately do so. Rather, our focus on framing processes
suggests ethics expertise to result from an ascription by the political system:
accordingly, ethics expertise in the present context is a form of knowledge that
is deemed relevant for the professional discourse over regulatory issues consid-
ered ethically problematic, for example within bodies giving policy advice such
as ethics commissions. The question of the defining criterion of ethical exper-
tise is expressed in the conflicts about the recruitment policy. The special fea-
ture of ethics expertise is the fact that it needs to be negotiated within an
interdisciplinary team. Ethics commissions usually include a wide spectrum
of experts from biology, medicine, law, social science, as well as representa-
tives of the churches and professional ethicists. The professional background
determines to a great extent whether and how expertise is acknowledged within
the internal processes of bargaining in the commissions. In contrast to experts
from the natural sciences, who can monopolize their specialized knowledge, the
expertise of professional ethicists may be openly challenged because expertise
in value questions is often supposed to be a basic competence of daily life.
7. For a historical overview of the institutionalization of bioethics, see Galloux
et al. (2002).
8. Our discussion is based on a research project entitled ‘‘Expert knowledge, the
public and political decisions,’’ which has been funded by the German Federal
Ministry of Education and Research in the framework program ‘‘Knowledge for
decision-making processes’’ and has been carried out at the Institute of Social
Research in Frankfurt am Main and the Institute of Technology Assessment
of the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna.
9. This body existed until the summer of 2007, and in the autumn of that year,
it was replaced by the German Ethics Council (Deutscher Ethikrat). This
has similar functions, but the procedure for appointing its members is
different.
10. Criticism was directed in particular at the institutional construction of the NER
and also at the fact that the process used for making appointments to it was not
transparent. See also Braun (2005) for an analysis that situated the NER within
the debate on biopolitics and argues that the body was a symbol of Chancellor
Schro¨der’s efforts to liberalize policy in this field.
11. On the tasks and structures of Study Commissions, see Brown, Lentsch, and
Weingart (2006, 94-109).
12. Bob Hepple, the NCB’s chair, spoke on the occasion of the presentation of a
consensual report on animal experiments of the value of ‘‘avoid[ing] the polar-
isation which has so often stifled rational debate’’ and praised the report as ‘‘a
short but ground-breaking consensus statement’’ (NCB 2005, 2).
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13. Social scientists as well (e.g., Jones, Walls, and Horlick-Jones 2006) consider
this orientation toward consensus as a criterion of quality for the outcome of
ethics committees’ deliberations. On an abstract level, this might be true for pol-
icy advice. However, any fundamental consensus in value conflicts cannot be
expected to be rich in content and, above all, to be credible.
14. We cannot go into detail here about the interesting question of how expertise is
negotiated in bodies such as the NERs. Our empirical analysis can be found in
Bogner and Menz (2005), which shows clearly that ethics—in the sense of a
philosophical discourse—does not play any major role in ethics commissions
(cf., Bogner, Menz, and Schumm 2008).
15. Pielke’s (2007) model is an attempt to draw attention to the way in which the
provision of scientific advice is bound to vary according to contextual political
factors (e.g., the intensity of conflict, uncertainty). His construction of four
types of policy advice challenges the idea that there can be one universally valid
recipe to be applied in all circumstances.
16. The role of an ‘‘Honest Broker of Policy Alternatives’’ did not comply with the
official remit of the commission in the case of Austria, where consensus was set
up as a major goal. However, in the course of the deliberation process, the coun-
cil liberated itself from this obligation.
17. In the following, we focus only on the relationship between expertise and pol-
itics. Of course, ethics expertise has more than just the function of legitimizing
political decision making. Under the most important is the function to foster
public debate, which is usually one of the main intentions of NERs.
18. Recently, that date was moved from January 1, 2002, to May 1, 2007.
19. Our conclusions are based on an analysis of seven major parliamentary debates
on stem cell research, PGD, and cloning between 2001 and 2005. Furthermore,
we have analyzed all commentaries on the recommendations of the NER and
the EK issued by members of the Bundestag in the form of press releases.
20. Our analysis thus differs from Mouffe’s thesis about what she describes as the
‘‘moralization of politics,’’ which we mentioned at the beginning of the article.
What Mouffe (2005) means by this is the return of fundamental we/they dis-
crimination to political debate, by means of which the opponent is categorized
not as a ‘‘legitimate adversary’’ but as an enemy who must be combated.
Moralizing exclusion of the enemy takes the place of political debate. In the
case we are investigating, this kind of outbreak of anatagonisms is prevented
by the individualization of political decisions about values. People who think
differently about an ethical question are not excluded; rather, the individual
positions they take are accepted as legitimate or even seen as an enrichment
of the debate, in the sense of a pluralism of conflicts over values that are not
themselves judged.
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21. This shows that differences in the way politics deals with expert dissent are
determined not only by different philosophical traditions (for example, the
British utilitarian vs. the continental deontological positions) but also by
different regulatory approaches (liberal or restrictive).
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